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Abstract
This is a brief reply to Goldstein’s article on “Quantum The-
ory Without Observers” in Physics Today. It is pointed out
that Bohm’s pilot wave theory is successful only because it keeps
Schro¨dinger’s (exact) wave mechanics unchanged, while the rest
of it is observationally meaningless and solely based on classical
prejudice.
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In his recent article on “Quantum Theory Without Observers” [1], Shel-
don Goldstein raised a number of important questions about quantum the-
ory. Even though I cannot quite understand what a universal physical theory
without any concept of observers could mean, I agree with many of his crit-
ical remarks. Bell, who once objected “against measurement”, also pointed
out that Bohm’s quantum theory depends on the assumption that only its
hypothetical classical variables can directly affect the consciousness of an
observer [2]. However, Goldstein’s characterization of the consequences that
have to be drawn from his criticism appears one-sided, since he neglects
many essential aspects.
In particular, he does not mention at all that Bohm’s classical trajec-
tories can neither be experimentally confirmed nor refuted if the theory
is exactly valid. It is always possible to postulate otherwise unobservable
(hence arbitrary) causes for stochastic events. Bohm’s presumed ensemble
of classical configurations is merely dynamically consistent because of their
presumed unobservable dynamics. The resulting trajectories are thus en-
tirely based on classical prejudice. Goldstein quotes Bell that “it should be
clear from the smallness of the scintillation on the screen that we have to
do with a particle.” Should it then not be as clear that the photon (or any
other boson) is a particle, too, rather than the consequence of a field on
three-dimensional space, as is assumed in Bohm’s theory? What is observed
as a local object is in all cases the position of a macroscopic “pointer” (such
as a flash on the screen or a track in the bubble chamber).
Appropriately localized wave packets representing pointer positions could
be explained as emerging in a fundamental irreversible “spontaneous local-
ization” process by means of a modified Schro¨dinger equation, such as it has
been proposed by Pearle or Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW) [3] and also
mentioned by Goldstein. Why then re-introduce classical variables? There
is no need (or any good reason) even for a Heisenberg picture in terms
of particles, nor for a wave-particle “dualism”. And why always represent
these classical variables by a (crucial) ensemble, while the wave function (the
other element of reality in Bohm’s theory) is normally regarded as given, but
tacitly excluded from being directly experienced by an observer?
The nonlinear terms in spontaneous localization models are chosen to
become relevant in measurements or similar situations in order to describe
von Neumann’s collapse of the wave function. However, equivalent effects in
the density matrix of any relevant system arise without any modification of
the Schro¨dinger equation if only the unavoidable environment of this system
is realistically taken into account by what Goldstein calls “Zurek’s decoher-
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ence” [4, 5]. Therefore, these two quite different dynamical mechanisms
(the disappearance and the dislocalization of phase relations) can both ex-
plain the emergence of apparent “particles” and other quasi-classical (local)
properties (such as Bell’s “small scintillations”). They cannot practically
be distinguished from one another in these cases, provided only the usual
probability rules apply somewhere and for something along the chain of in-
teractions between pointer and observer(s) in order to justify the concept
of a density matrix. Goldstein’s claim that “the environment acts as an
observer” is quite wrong: decoherence is an objective physical process that
is essential (and unavoidable) also in Bohm’s theory for correctly guiding
the postulated classical pointer positions or other macroscopic variables.
The application of a probabilistic collapse just where environmental de-
coherence occurs anyway is thus as much a prejudice as the existence of
classical particles and fields. “Appearences are misleading.” Here I fully
agree with Goldstein (although appearance requires an observer). In con-
trast to Bohm, Pearle and GRW proposed modifications of quantum theory
that can be experimentally refuted (and very probably have been unless
modified again [6]). While the search for deviations from the Schro¨dinger
equation is a reasonable endevour, one must warn young scientists against
spending their time on calculating Bohm trajectories or “unraveling” entan-
gled (open) systems — as suggestive as these pictures may appear to the
traditionalistic mind. They would be investigating mere phantoms. Such
calculations would be meaningful if they led to new observable consequences.
However, precisely this is excluded by construction of Bohm’s theory, while
a quantum system that is entangled with its environment clearly does not
possess any wave function by its own. The idea of “quantum trajectories”
for all systems of interest, now quite popular in quantum optics, is (1) in-
consistent (as it would depend on the precise choice of the systems), (2)
incompatible with a Schro¨dinger equation (even if that were complemented
by a phenomonological collapse), and (3) in conflict with relevant experi-
ments.
Most experiments are local and not relevant for this purpose (thus per-
mitting the concept of a local density matrix, or an apparent ensemble of
wave functions representing it). However, all basic quantum experiments
performed during recent decades have confirmed consequences of a nonlocal
wave function(al), defined on a high-dimensional space that we are used to
interpret as a classical configuration space. These consequences appear as
“paradoxes” when described in terms of particles or spatial waves (fields).
The Schro¨dinger equation, which unavoidably leads to drastic (eventually
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universal) entanglement between all macroscopic systems (and thereby lo-
cally to decoherence) [7], would not have to be modified at all by means of
the apparently required probalistic terms if one dropped the further preju-
dice that there is only one state of each observer in this “nonlocal reality”.
A universally exact Schro¨dinger equation would require that there is an ever
increasing number of different “versions” of the quasi-classical world with
all its observers, which are individually described by robust wave packets
in appropriate factor spaces of this high-dimensional space. According to
wave mechanics, observers can only exist in dynamically branching, there-
after essentially autonomous components of the global wave function. These
observer versions would practically lack any possibility of communicating
with one another, and therefore need not be assumed to disappear from re-
ality with precisely one exception (as postulated by the collapse). Because
of their dynamical autonomy, these global branch wave functions describe
“consistent histories” to their observers. In order to be subjectively and
individually experienced, a component of the global wave function seems
to have to possess the product form ψobsΨrest, with a sufficiently complex
and robust observer state ψobs, and regardless of the existence of any clas-
sical observer variables. The observer is the only “system” that has to be
conceptually defined in principle.
All we have then still to assume in order to explain Born’s probabilities
in the form of observable frequencies of measurement results is that we,
described by certain correlated ψobs’s, happen to live in a branch that does
not possess a very small norm. This robust component would represent an
“apparent reality” to us (in the operational sense), that also forms the basis
of Zurek’s “existential interpretation” [8].
It is usually overlooked that Bohm’s theory contains the same “many
worlds” of dynamically separate branches as the Everett interpretation (now
regarded as “empty” wave components), since it is based on precisely the
same (“absolutely real”) global wave function [2]. Its robust components
branch by means of decoherence (rather than combining by means of re-
coherence) because of a fundamental initial condition to the global wave
function that is also responsible for the Second Law [9] — not because of
“increasing knowledge” about a classical state (the reduction of Bohm’s en-
semble). Only the “occupied” wave packet itself is thus meaningful, while
the assumed classical trajectory would merely point at it: “This is where
we are in the quantum world.” However, this can be done without using a
trajectory. Any pointing finer than compatible with the width of the robust
wave packet is empirically unjustified. John Bell (who rejected Everett’s
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interpretation for being “extravagant”) seems to have realized this equiva-
lence before he began to favor spontaneous localization (such as GRW) over
Bohm’s theory [10]. This is another (historical) fact simply neglected by
Goldstein when he heavily relies on Bell’s words in his arguments.
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